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## ACTOR STRATEGY AND PROSPECTIVE APPROACHES: AN ATTEMPT TO FORMALIZE POWER MECHANISMS WITHIN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND PROGRAMS FINANCED BY INTERNATIONAL AID IN CAMEROON

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**Abstract.** This paper is based on the intelligent analysis of the actors' games within the Development Projects and Programs (DPP). Indeed, an empirical study was conducted with eleven (11) groups of essential actors of the DPP system in Cameroon, following the MACTOR approach (Method of Actors, Objectives, Power Relations). The aim was to analyze the structure of the influences between the actors and to define the position of each one with respect to the objectives. The actancial results recorded show that the power relationships are established in four (04) types: dominant, relay, dominated and autonomous. The results highlight the participatory management of the DPP system by the Technical and Financial Development Partner, the Regulator, the Technical Team Leader and to some extent the Steering Committee. In addition, a need for transparency, power organization and dynamization was identified as a necessity, in order to positively impact the performance of DPPs in Cameroon. Prospects for the development of the DPP system as a trial were proposed.

**Keywords:** MACTOR, International aid, Actors, DPP system, Cameroon.

## ESTRATEGIA DE LOS ACTORES Y ENFOQUES PROSPECTIVOS : UN INTENTO DE FORMALIZAR LOS MECANISMOS DE PODER EN LOS PROYECTOS Y PROGRAMAS DE DESARROLLO FINANCIADOS POR LA AYUDA INTERNACIONAL EN CAMERÚN

**Resumen.** Este trabajo se basa en el análisis inteligente de los juegos de actores dentro de los Proyectos y Programas de Desarrollo (PPD). En efecto, se realizó un estudio empírico con once (11) grupos de actores esenciales del sistema de PPD en Camerún, siguiendo el enfoque MACTOR (Método de Actores, Objetivos, Relaciones de Poder). El objetivo era analizar la estructura de las influencias entre los actores y definir la posición

de cada uno con respecto a los objetivos. Los resultados actanciales registrados muestran que las relaciones de poder se establecen en cuatro (04) tipos: dominante, relevo, dominado y autónomo. Los resultados destacan la gestión participativa del sistema PPD por parte del Socio de Desarrollo Técnico y Financiero, el Regulador, el Jefe del Equipo Técnico y, en cierta medida, el Comité Directivo. Además, se identificó la necesidad de transparencia, organización del poder y dinamización, con el fin de impactar positivamente en el desempeño de los PPD en Camerún. Se propusieron perspectivas de desarrollo del sistema de PPD como ensayo.

**Palabras clave:** MACTOR, Ayuda internacional, Actores, Sistema PPD, Camerún

## **Introduction**

Cameroon, like other French-speaking countries, is committed to ambitious programs for economic emergence by 2035. To achieve this, the country is based on four (04) poles of action, economic business for its emergence: the agricultural and environmental pole; the industrial pole of production and transformation; the pole of services and new technologies and the pole of governance. (MINEPAT, 2022). The pooling of these clusters, which have been consolidated, has resulted in the National Development Strategy 2020-2030 (NDS30). This strategy is based on four strategic axes: the structural transformation of the national economy; the development of human capital; the promotion of employment and the integration of young people into the economic circuit; and finally, governance, decentralization and strategic management of the State. (MINEPAT, 2020, p. 40).

What these Emergence plans have in common is that they all involve major investment and/or development projects. The DPPs in Cameroon are therefore the crucible of emergence. They are the opportunities to meet the specific and fundamental needs of the people of Cameroon. Through these DPPs, access to basic services should be assured (Assontia Djoudji, 2022). Although the rhetoric has not changed since independence, SND believes that the structural transformation of the economy will be achieved through DPPs as an additive to other structuring projects (MINEPAT, 2020). As such, they are places where actors come together.

Some authors, relying on MACTOR, consider these actors to be messy in the governance of protected areas (Kouassi, 2018), while others, following the MACTOR approach, highlight a participatory management of the tourism sector, but with a huge need for transparency and organization of power as the key point (Belfellah, & Gassemi, 2016). This same tool is used to illustrate the game of actors of geographic information (Bassaler, 2004). However, it remains little used in DPPs.

Development aid would be positioned in this case as a step towards a theory of social change. The objective of this work is to identify the main actors and their mechanisms of influence and power within a system called DPP in Cameroon. This study is a response to the following problem: Assuming that the DPP is a system that evolves according to a contractual logic, taking into consideration the NDS 30, how do the different actors in the system interact with each other in terms of their objectives and those of the NDS 30? Can the analysis of the game of actors by the MACTOR method lead to the development of this system?

This contribution is articulated around the theoretical and conceptual approach; the approach followed and the attempt of explanation and discussion.

## **Methodology**

### ***Theoretical and conceptual approach***

In the perspective of this research, which starts with a documentary review and a series of interviews, which, in a cross-sectional framework, with a non-probabilistic convenience sample, as part of a combinatory approach to both the qualitative and quantitative in a mortgage-deductive approach, deals with the attempt to formalise power mechanisms within development projects and programmes financed by international aid in Cameroon; analyzed from a stakeholder strategy and prospective approach perspective backed by the MACTOR method.

### ***Theory of planned change***

Guy Rochet (1968) suggested that the theory of planned social change (ToC) be understood as any temporally identifiable and verifiable transformation that affects the functioning of a community. Thus, development aid justifies its existence by the externalities it generates, that is, by its results on the community. This seems to add to the complexity of measuring performance; the assessment of DPP performance is thus based on more or less objective criteria that can be easily and reliably measured with indicators, but also on more subtle aspects that are difficult to measure and result from the fact that "it is difficult to find activity indicators that are unequivocally linked to externalities" (Sponem, & Chatelain-Ponroy, 2009, p. 4).

According to this model, change is first conceived theoretically before being implemented in situ. In the design phase, the planner first identifies the need and then constructs potential solutions to the identified need. At the end of this conceptual process, he ensures the feasibility of the solutions considered. He looks for the financial, material, human and temporal resources that will allow him to reach the expected objectives. It also implements the program by carrying out the activities planned in the project's Logical Framework (LF). In this step, the planner anticipates assumptions and risks that may hinder the achievement of objectives: poor project design, resource shortfalls, or hazards beyond the planner's control. In fact, over the last two decades, there has been an increase in the use of ToC in the design and evaluation of DPPs (Tarazona, 2020). This is especially true since many DPPs have adopted it. Also, government agencies and other non-governmental organizations, in order to be consistent with their strategies, are embracing ToC as a solution to ensure that their day-to-day activities are aligned with their ultimate goals. ToC has become a key instrument in many DPP evaluations. (Augustyn, 2022). It also seems to be widely used in international development (Vogel, 2012) and community action. (Salathé-Beaulieu, & Léonard, 2018).

### ***The concept of development***

Development, or rather, the normative understanding of what it should be, is an extremely composite phenomenon, both in its genesis and definition and in its effects. (Assontia Djoudji, 2022). It appears to be a panacea for a range of social and political problems around the world. It has also succeeded in intruding into the contemporary economic and managerial field despite the contradictions it raises. Critics, often based on empirical studies showing the limits of this approach (Escobar, 1984), have drawn attention to the resiliencies and counter-discourses of both the so-called South and the so-called North, which pose a series of challenges to the understanding of the concept. This change is largely related to its malleability and versatility.

Kassé (2009) points out that this concept has suffered the wear and tear of a disjointed evolution, first as an objective among classical economists, then rejected by the dominant neo-

classicists. Today it is the subject of political, economic and sociological discourse. The notion of development is intimately linked to that of progress, industry, job creation and urban growth (Aliste et al., 2017). Yet, they continue, various social, political, economic, cultural and ecological tensions have made it difficult to realize the promises of this notion.

Tagou (2011) considers that the Anglo-Saxons are more precise with the social dimension and the poverty parameter, unlike the Francophones. The UNDP (1991), in its approach, does not define it explicitly, but describes its purpose, the objective of human development, the choices offered to the population, and participatory democracy. This description creates an ambiguity, which refers to an ideal and makes one think that "development does not exist" (Tagou, 2011, p.25). It is a state of mind, with variable geometric trajectories that must be followed by all entities that aspire to greater well-being.

In any case, the concept of development, regardless of the straitjacket it wears, is like a chameleon. In this paradigm shift, we must rely on people to lead human societies towards a planned change.

#### *State of play/synoptic overview of DPPs in Cameroon*

Following the Organizational Audit of the DPPs under the Ministry in charge of Agriculture and Rural Development (MINADER) in Cameroon, recommendations were made. Among these recommendations, the restructuring of the entities is strongly advocated. According to the terms of Decisions N° 00695 and 00696/MINADER/CAB/UCSP, some projects were dissolved, new projects were created, some reframing was done and finally others were maintained in their specific mandates (MINADER, 2016). This reform should theoretically put an end to the proliferation of duplication observed in the DPP arena. It should be noted that this reorganization does not concern DPPs financed partially or entirely by international aid funds. They provide an understanding of the system.

In 2008, the report of the Association Citoyenne de Défense des Intérêts Collectifs (ACDIC) highlighted illicit practices in the management of the corn project. It describes the creation of fictitious Common Initiative Groups (GIC) to use up budget lines, corruption and influence peddling. The intervention of the National Anti-Corruption Commission (CONAC) from December 22, 2008 to January 20, 2009, led to the interpellation of its coordinator.

The Agropoles Program (PAG) has in its turn come to account for the gaping hole in which the Cameroonian population is immersed. The site Cameroon-Info.Net in its communication of May 10, 2017, recalls that it was in 2012 that the State of Cameroon had announced the establishment of the "Agropoles Program", which aimed to reduce production deficits in the agricultural sector and consequently limit imports of certain foodstuffs. Two phases had then been decided, five (5) years later, this vast project in which the Government was to invest 9.8 billion FCFA (15 million Euros) seems not to produce the expected effects, notes the daily Le Messenger of Tuesday, May 9, 2017.

Overall, the results of the 2018 evaluation, are not in line with expected hopes, no target achieved in the areas of crop, animal and fisheries production, according to the National Institute of Statistics (INS). Cameroon continues to experience deficits in its agricultural production. The security situation in the North-West, South-West and Far-North regions is not unrelated to this. However, it is important to note that the said program is housed and piloted by the Ministry in charge of Planning and Land Management (MINEPAT) instead of the Ministry in charge of Livestock, Fisheries and Animal Industries (MINEPIA) and MINADER.

Also, does this reason and many others not justify the disappearance, liquidation or restructuring at the origin of the systemic inadequacies of management and governance recorded in our development projects ? Obviously, we must not forget the cyclical and/or

structural ones. Issues related to social organization are hardly ever highlighted to justify the mixed results. In this regard, Picard et al. (2017) note that the mixed results of the program are primarily related to the scope of the program.

#### *The Mission for the Regulation of the Supply of Consumer Products (MIRAP)*

It is a structure for alerting, purchasing, importing and storing consumer products, with a view to supplying the market in the best conditions. A mission with potential failures, seems to wonder Sofack (2018). A concern shared by economic operators and civil society actors.

For Njonga (2011), MIRAP is a disaster for local production. According to Sofack (2018), this is a contradiction of public discourses that advocate packages of measures to strengthen Cameroon's food sovereignty. This is a contradiction of public discourses that advocate packages of measures to strengthen Cameroon's food sovereignty. Yet, paradoxically, the primary mission of this body is to ensure, through imports, the supply of basic foodstuffs to the markets.

Babissakana (2011), believes that MIRAP is a conceptual, methodological and institutional step backwards. This mission will undermine the functioning of a market economy. It cannot solve any problem in a sustainable way, beneficial for the economic and social progress of the country.

#### *Duplicate Projects and Programs : SEMRY vs SODERIM ; PD-COBIE vs PRODEL vs PD-CVEP*

The case of duplication observed is SEMRY (Société d'Expansion et de la Modernisation de la Riziculture de Yagoua) and SODERIM (Société de Développement de la Riziculture dans la plaine des M'Bo), two development companies with comparable or even identical missions and objectives. In the end, Cameroon imports rice in abundance.

These same duplications are observed when one questions the missions and objectives of the Livestock Development and Marketing and Infrastructure Project (PD-COBIE), the Livestock Development Project (PRODEL) and the Livestock and Fish Farming Value Chain Development Project (PD-CVEP). There is no clear boundary between these entities, and if so, the PTDs are different. This leads to questions about the strategic development planning of the livestock sub-sector (MINEPIA, 2021).

#### *National Rural Development Fund (FONADER)*

Ndjogui et al. (2014) identified two endogenous and exogenous causes for the collapse and subsequent closure of FONADER.

Among the endogenous causes : excessive centralization, administrative red tape and also a lack of transparency in the monitoring of loan repayments. The most important exogenous factor is the disengagement of the State from the productive sectors.

The factors responsible for its failure have a common denominator in the systemic insufficiency of management and governance (Ndjogui et al., 2014). As a result, in their temporalities, projects carry within them the genes of their death.

#### ***Approach followed***

##### *Actors' strategy*

In a given system, what is known as an Actor's strategy is in fact everything that will furnish his behavior to protect his interests (Crozier, & Friedberg, 1977). The Actor will thus surf on the relational fiber via alliances, collaborations, oppositions and even negotiations to build his margin of maneuver. What is important for the actor is to achieve his goals. Hatem

(1993), taken up by (Belfellah, & Gassemi, 2016, p. 30) defines the Actor as a person, a group or an organization, aiming at certain objectives and confronted with certain constraints, and which can, by its strategies and its means of action, influence the future of the system studied. In the same vein, Michel Godet (2007a) says that the Actor is a homogeneous group with common objectives and means of action, implementing the same strategy and displaying a balance of power in relation to other Actors. Thus, the Actors do not evolve on the same diapason, the zones of power are not definitively fixed, as Crozier, & Friedberg (1977) emphasize. They are constantly recomposed according to the evolution of the context. The coveted strategic objective is the control of the zone(s) of uncertainty which are the real source(s) of power. The goal of the strategic game is the control of the zones of uncertainty that are a source of power (Smida, 2003). In these zones of uncertainty, the actor takes inventory of his strengths and weaknesses and relies on these zones in turn to dominate, to exercise his power (Crozier, & Friedberg, 1977).

Thus, according to the authors of *The Actor and the System*, power in an organization is distributed over four (04) contextually dynamic zones : The first is hierarchical and emphasizes the Actor's status as an authority ; the second is called expert and refers to the Actor's competence in a given field; the third is devoted to information, i.e., the Actor holds decisive information; and the fourth is related to the environment, i.e., the link between the Actor and the organization's periphery.

In any case, the Actor seems to be more concrete in his actions because of the regulation mechanisms of which he is the sole holder. From then on, this "uncertain" construct, which is always "in the works", allows actors to establish, in difficult situations, the transactions necessary to maintain and continue their actions (Belfellah, & Gassemi, 2016).

In Cameroon, the DPPs symbolize a system of strategic games between actors. The NDS 30 constitutes fertile ground in the construction of an emerging Cameroon by 2035. However, it seems legitimate to question the consistency of the constituent actors, their goals, their objectives, their constraints, their means of action and strategic issues. Strategic games are of immense interest because they define the modes of cooperation and interaction between the different actors in a voice characterized by the pursuit of objectives and the establishment of sustainable relationships between these actors.

### ***Data collection method***

The methodological approach focused on a documentary review of the power themes and the strategy of the actors, particularly those of the DPPs in Cameroon. Then, interviews were conducted between August 2021 and January 2022 with nine (9) PPDs and financial and technical institutions that were willing to give their time to the problem raised by the research object. As a result, eleven (11) groups of actors were formed out of the fifty or so actors met and observed. The items discussed concerned the power games within the DPPs, the strategies of influence and dependence between Actors, the power relationships...

### ***Data analysis method***

MACTOR makes it possible to analyze the content of the actors' powers in the DPP system in Cameroon and to formalize an explanation of their actions with regard to the facts observed (Assontia Djoudji, 2022). Analysis of the game of actors, their strategies, conflicts and alliances, and examinations of their power relations are essential to highlight the evolution of strategic issues and pose key questions for the future of DPPs in Cameroon (Assontia et al., 2022).

MACTOR proposes a progression in seven (07) successive steps (Godet, 2004 ; Godet, 2007b), but for this theme, four (04) stops are retained:

- Identification of the actors in the PPD system in Cameroon.
- Identification of the issues and objectives pursued by these actors.
- Construction of basic matrices, i.e., the Actor/Actor matrix and the Actor/Objective matrix
- Interpretation of the results based on processing with the MACTOR software.

The MACTOR method was also used as a tool to analyze the power mechanisms of several studies, the logics of influence and the strategies of Actors (Lafourcade & Chapuy, 2000 ; Smida, 2003; Bendahan et al., 2004 ; Munteanu & Apetroae, 2007 ; Kotbi et al., 2011 ; Blanc, 2012; Elmsalmi & Hachicha, 2014; Saricam, Kalaoglu et al., 2014 ; Saricam, Polat, et al., 2014; Rees and MacDonell, 2017 ; Ben-Daoud et al., 2021). The present study is based on a forward-looking methodology, the MACTOR method. The analysis of the interplay of actors, their interactions and influence strategies, and the examination of their power relations (constraints and means of action) are essential to highlight the evolution of strategic issues and pose key questions for the future of DPPs in Cameroon (Assontia et al., 2022 ; Assontia Djoudji, 2022). The MACTOR method thus models the interactions between the various stakeholders in the DPPs.

### ***Advantages and limitations of the MACTOR method***

The advantage of the Mactor method is that it is highly operational for a wide variety of games involving numerous players in relation to a series of issues and associated objectives. The Mactor method has a number of limitations, particularly in terms of gathering the necessary information. In addition, this method assumes that the behaviour of each player is in line with its objectives, which is not always the case in reality (Assontia Djoudji (2022).

### ***Identification of actors in the DPP system in Cameroon***

A list of eleven (11) groups of actors (Table 1) was formalized, which are considered essential whose managerial logics have an impact on the performance of DPPs in Cameroon.

**Table 1**

*Table of Identification and Grouped Distribution of DPP Actors in Cameroon*

N°	Actors : long title	Short title
<b>GROUP OF INTERNAL ACTORS</b>		
1	Coordinators	COORDO
2	Technical Assistants	TA
3	Project Management Units	PMU
<b>EXTERNAL ACTORS GROUP</b>		
4	Régulateur (Etat)	REGUL
5	Technical Development Partners	TDP
6	Suppliers	SUPP
7	Team Technical Leader	TTL
8	Opponents	OPP
9	Beneficiaries	BENE
10	Opinion Makers	OP_Mak
11	Steering Committee	ST_Comm

### ***Identification of the issues and objectives pursued by these actors***

This phase of the MACTOR method consists of identifying the system's issues and the objectives (Table 2) associated with them in order to position each stakeholder in relation to each of its objectives. These actors have powers in the DPP system that may converge or diverge between them.

**Table 2**  
*Table on Issues and associated influencing objectives*

Issues in the arena	Associated objectives (long title)	Short title
E1 : power and control (influence)	<b>O<sub>1</sub></b> : Formalize the clientelist nature of development aid	CLIENT_APD
	<b>O<sub>2</sub></b> : Giving a new meaning to budget support and support to DPPs	NVO_SAB_ACCOM
	<b>O<sub>3</sub></b> : Improving the capitalization of the achievements of development projects	CAPIT_ACQUI
	<b>O<sub>4</sub></b> : Promoting the Regulator's control over development projects	EMPRI_REGUL
E2 : the social aspect of DPPs	<b>O<sub>5</sub></b> : Involve and adjust beneficiaries' priorities in the definition of government objectives and DWPs	PRIORI_BENE
	<b>O<sub>6</sub></b> : Ensure that the gender aspect is taken into account in the distribution of positions of responsibility in the DPPs	GENRE_RESP
E3 : Performance - DPP Management	<b>O<sub>7</sub></b> : Improve/ensure the living conditions of all populations involved in the DPPs	CONDI_VIE
	<b>O<sub>8</sub></b> : Reforming the effective funding and/or subsidization of the rural sector	FINANC_SUBV
	<b>O<sub>9</sub></b> : Improving the management of DPPs and the impact of development actions on beneficiaries	MNGT+IMPACT
	<b>O<sub>10</sub></b> : Encourage "customer" listening (opponent - beneficiary - employee - supplier)	ECOUTE
	<b>O<sub>11</sub></b> : Improve the performance of the PPDs and adapt the Regulator and TDP indicators to the projects	PERF+INDICA
	<b>O<sub>12</sub></b> : Evaluate the effectiveness of the internal control and risk management system to remedy identified weaknesses	CTRL-INT+MNGT_RISK
	<b>O<sub>13</sub></b> : Ensure PMU control of planning and improve maturity of DPPs	PLAN+MA faTU
E4 : la Coordination des PPD	<b>O<sub>14</sub></b> : Improve coordination synergy in the implementation of DWP and Regulator recommendations within the PMU	SYNER-COORDI
	<b>O<sub>15</sub></b> : Improving the flow of information in the DPPs	CIRC_INFO
	<b>O<sub>16</sub></b> : Ensure effective funding of DPPs from earmarked funds	FIN_PPD
	<b>O<sub>17</sub></b> : Respecting the temporality in Development Projects and Programs	TEMPO_PPD

*Construction of basic matrices: the Actor/Actor matrix and the Actor/objective matrix*

The first matrix is the one that pits Actors against Actors, also known as the matrix of direct/indirect influences between actors (MIDI), and focuses, on the basis of a rating scale, on the powers that Actors have to influence each other. The second matrix or Actors/Objectives, reminds us that the Actors are not all driven by the same objectives, here we speak of the Valued Positions of the Actors on the objectives (tables 3 and 4).



Tables 3&4 present respectively the matrix of influences between actors and the positioning of each actor in relation to the objectives.

**Table 3**

*Table of the Matrix of Direct and Indirect Influences (MIDI)*

MIDI	TA	PMU	COORDO	REGUL	TDP	SUPP	TTL/TM/O TP	OPP	BENE	OP_Mak	ST_Comm	li
TA	-	14	17	13	13	11	8	5	14	4	9	108
PMU	7	-	11	11	9	9	5	4	10	4	5	75
COORDO	10	13	-	12	13	11	6	5	15	4	8	97
REGUL	10	16	17	-	14	10	9	5	16	4	9	110
TDP	13	15	19	16	-	11	9	5	13	4	8	113
SUPP	5	7	8	5	5	-	4	5	8	3	5	55
TTL/TM/OTP	11	12	15	12	11	11	-	4	13	4	8	101
OPP	3	4	5	3	4	3	3	-	5	2	3	35
BENE	5	7	6	6	6	5	4	5	-	3	5	52
OP_Mak	6	6	7	7	6	6	6	3	7	-	7	61
ST Comm	8	9	10	8	8	8	7	5	10	4	-	77
Di	78	103	115	93	89	85	61	46	111	36	67	884

Table 4 shows that there is very little disagreement between actors on the subject of objectives. Thus, consideration of the positioning of actors in relation to the objectives using the Actors x Objectives matrix seems sufficient to highlight the epicenter of the game of actors in the DPP system in Cameroon.

**Table 4**

*Table of Valued Stakeholder Positions on Objectives (of order 2) : Matrix 2MAO*

2MAO	CLIENT_APD	NVO_SAB_ACC	CAPA_ACQUI	EMPRI_REGUL	PRIORI_BENE	GENRE_RESP	CONDI_VIE	FINANC_SUBV	MNGT+IMPACT	ECOUTE_CLIEN	PERF+INDICA	EFFICA+MNGT	PLAN+MATU	SYNER-COORDI	CIRC_INFO	FIN_PPD	TEMPO_PPD	Somme absolue
TA	3	3	2	1	3	2	3	2	2	-1	2	2	1	1	2	2	3	35
PMU	3	3	2	2	3	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	1	2	42
COORDO	3	3	3	2	4	2	2	2	3	3	2	3	3	3	2	1	3	44
REGUL	4	3	2	3	3	2	3	4	3	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	3	45
TDP	4	2	2	1	3	3	2	1	2	1	2	2	3	2	1	2	3	36
SUPP	0	0	-2	-1	2	0	1	2	0	2	0	1	2	0	2	0	2	17
TTL/TM/	2	2	0	1	2	2	3	1	3	1	2	3	2	1	1	2	2	30
OPP	-1	0	0	0	-1	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	-1	1	0	-1	9
BENE	0	1	1	2	3	0	2	1	2	3	1	0	1	2	2	1	1	23
OP_Mak	0	-1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	6
ST_Comm	0	1	1	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	29
Number of agreements	19	18	13	14	25	15	24	17	20	20	16	18	19	15	19	14	21	
Number of disagreements	-1	-1	-2	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	-1	0	0	-1	
Number of positions	20	19	15	15	26	15	24	17	20	21	16	18	19	16	19	14	22	

\*The intensity of its positioning, which characterizes the degree of priority of the objective for the actor and for which five levels have been distinguished :

4 : the objective challenges the actor's existence / is essential to its existence,

3 : the objective affects the fulfilment of the actor's missions / is indispensable to its missions,

2 : the objective calls into question the success of the actor's projects / is indispensable to its projects,

1 : the objective involves, in a limited way in time and space, the actor's operating processes (management, etc.) / is indispensable to its operating processes,

0 : the objective is of little consequence.

The application of MACTOR software to these data produced results that are analyzed in the following section.

Before making any attempt, it is important to make sense of the actors' issues (Table 2), which in this case are in fact the common threads that carry the objectives of each actor into the arena, the battlefields that are the DPPs in Cameroon.

## Results and discussion

The NDS30 shows that the structural transformation of the economy will be achieved through the DPPs as an additive to other structuring projects (NDS30, 2020). As such, they are places where actors from all walks of life, potential strategists of influence, come together.

### *Analysis of the structure of influences between the different Actors*

The analysis of the structure of influence between the different actors of the DPPs allows the most influential actors to be classified: Dominant, autonomous, relay and dominated Actors.

### *Analysis of direct and indirect influences (MIDI)*

The MIDI matrix (Table 3) allows us to identify the direct and indirect influences of order 2 between Actors. The most influential actors in the Cameroonian DPP system are the PPD, REGUL, TA and TTL, a very significant dominance.

### *Analysis of the plan of influences and dependencies (PID)*

The Plan of Influences and Dependencies (PID) shows a graphical representation of the positioning of the actors, according to their direct and indirect net influences and dependencies (Ii and Di) (Figure 1). This positioning is automatically generated by the MACTOR software.

The MIDI matrix and the Influence-Dependence Plan (IDP) provide information about the DPP arena in Cameroon and maps the positions of the different actors in the system, the behavior of the groups of actors involved. Such a situation did not escape Godet (2007) when he recalled in 1978, although far away, and in the midst of the growth of world air transport, the actor Aéroport de Paris had no interest in charter airlines, because the latter were the weakest link in the balance of power of the European air transport system.


The mapping generated by MACTOR software highlights a PPD system in Cameroon divided into four parts (Figure 1), supported by the degree of influence (Ii) and dependency (Di) (Table 3). The relay actors have a high degree of power because they can give the "green light" or block PPDs. By way of illustration, the PPD and REGUL as the secant marginal, in the sense of sociologists Crozier and Friedberg (1992) taken up by (Messalti, 2018), that is, "an actor who is a stakeholder in several systems of action in relation to each other and who can, as a result, play an indispensable role as an intermediary and interpreter between different, even contradictory, logics of action. In other words, for the first (PTD) can cancel out the activities of other actors, for example by cancelling out funding. For the second (REGUL), it can, for

example, cancel the implementation of a DPP. The dominant actors appear to be key mediators in the execution of the links between actors in the DPP system in Cameroon. This is the eloquent case of the TTLs, who are "alpha" and "omega" in the sense of the future of DPP funds in Cameroon. The so-called autonomous actors, who can still be described as offside actors (OP\_Mak and OPP), are like the "leftovers". On the other hand, the dominated actors obey the different spillover effects of the Actors, regardless of their coalitions or conflicts, and their reaction is always positive, as illustrated by the case of the Suppliers and Beneficiaries.

Still from figure 1, the relay actors show a strong involvement/mobilization. The actors COORDO, PMU and REGUL lead this classification. The REGULATOR, as its name indicates, is responsible for regulating the DPP system in Cameroon by guaranteeing that the strategic and operational objectives of the DPPs are achieved, with respect to the various actors and particularly the visions of the various PTDs.

**Figure 1**


*Graph showing the Pattern of Influences and Dependencies (PID) between stakeholder groups*



The histogram in Figure 2 shows the power relations of the entire DPP system under study. Three groups of actors emerge from this work. Firstly, there is the group of actors with a high-power ratio ( $R_i > 1$ ) composed of TTL, TDP, REGUL, COORDO and AT. On closer inspection, this is in fact the group of so-called dominant and relay actors in the PPD system. Secondly, the group of actors with a moderately high  $R_i$  ( $0.5 \leq R_i \leq 1$ ), this group includes actors such as FOUR, FAIS\_OP, PMU and ST\_Comm. And third and last group ; These are the actors with low  $R_i$  ( $R_i < 0.5$ ). These are OPP and BENE. The particularity of these actors is paradoxically their strong dependence and weak influence on the other actors of the DPP system. In fact, the OPP actor seems to be more autonomous and/or sometimes out of the picture in relation to the DPP system.

**Figure 2**

Graph showing the power ratio or weight of each group of actors from MIDI



**Identification of the apparent strategies of the actors in the DPP system in Cameroon**

A synoptic synthesis of the apparent strategies of the Actors of the DPP system in Cameroon is highlighted in this section (Table 5).

**Table 5**

Synoptic summary table of the apparent strategies of the actors of the DPP system in Cameroon

Actors	Strategies
TDP	The marginal secant of the DPP system in Cameroon with a Relais position. Financial and economic power. Domination, self-interested political control.
BENE	Resilience and resignation. Abnegation, dominated actors, with limited power. Display high dependency.
SUPP	Dominated actors in the system, but still important to all others. Navigate between the desires of the system's principals.
REGU	The marginal secant of the PPD system in Cameroon, with a relay position, it has absolute power over the PPD system environment.
OP_Mak	Powerful communication networks, physical and human networks. Offside or Autonomous actors. Balancing Actors.
PPO	Pressure on decision-makers. Displays and defends an assumed or unclear position against the project.
TTL	A Dominant System Actor. Omnipresence in country strategy. Leadership. Lack of knowledge of country risk, financial power.
COORDO	The Marginal secant with a relay position. Strong involvement/mobilization. Social and political eminence.
TA	The crucial partner for the Regulator in its policy implementation. Aid clientelism. Actor relay, guarantor of PTD funds.
PMU	An important actor in the DPP system in Cameroon.
ST_Com	A dominant actor 'in spite of itself'. The guarantor of the smooth running of a project.

Note: Source : Extracted and adapted from Assontia Djoudji (2022).

### **Formulation of development prospects for DPPs in Cameroon**

The forecasts in question refer to the dynamics of anticipation and the relevance of DPPs in Cameroon, together with scenarios based on the DELPHI method. This approach is a forecasting and decision support technique based on expert judgement (Landeta, 2006). Widely applied in the field of projects (Delphi method, n.d.), DELPHI is a systematic method for consensus (Dalkey & Helmer, 1963) or ranking after consecutive repetitions (Maleki, 2009).

The analysis of the discourse of the observed and met Actors highlighted a kind of degree of consensus related to each scenario. It emerged that the percentage of consensus on each scenario ranged from 80-90% in the first scenario, to 50-65% in the second and 55-70% in the third.

As a result, in Cameroon, the scenarios on the strategic analysis of the actors in the DPP system are based on three levers : the first lever is actancial, which is reflected in the mixed performance recorded by the DPPs precisely because of the conflicting and divergent logics and power relations of the actors. The second is contextualization and adaptability of the DPPs and the third and last is foresight, i.e., deep and intelligent anticipation of the DPP system in Cameroon.

### **Conclusion**

The purpose of this paper was to analyse the strategy of actors in a prospective de-approach in the light of the mechanisms of provision within the PPDs in Cameroon.

The actual results show that the evaluation of the power relationships has allowed their hierarchization into four (04) types: dominant, relay, dominated and autonomous, and a participatory management of the system by the Technical and Financial Partner (TFP) of development, the Regulator (State), the Technical Team Leader (TTL) and to a certain extent the Steering Committee (St\_Comm). In addition, there was also a great need for enlightenment, power organization and dynamization in order to have positive repercussions on the performance of DPPs in Cameroon.

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